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SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT 2: FRZ:blr
12 September 1952

APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR SUCCESSION IN THE USSR

1. General Analysis

Previous attempts to produce a plan which will provide policy and operational framework for a coordinated U. S. psychological attack with respect to the problem of succession have never reached the approved official stage, let alone any aspect of preparatory implementation. The initial plan [redacted] 25X1A geared its philosophy to the need for research, intelligence, and high-level estimates, which were not produced, and a listing of requirements far in excess of existing or prospective capabilities. The second plan [redacted] treated the problem more generally, outlined the objectives, and provided for a decentralization of operational planning. Neither approach contributed to a definitive resolution of the problem. It is now recognized that a package treatment of the problem is not logical at this juncture, but that a progressive, phased approach is practical based on the following incontrovertible facts: 25X1A

a. The death of Stalin is an inevitable event.

b. The possibility of stresses and strains developing in the Soviet hierarchy as a consequence is strong, inasmuch as the advent of war or the death of Stalin offer the most predictable chances of strain.

c. A favorable opportunity for exploitation of the inevitability and later the result may exist.

d. Calculated

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d. Calculated preparatory measures for such exploitation will increase the successful prospect of achieving U. S. goals.

e. Time may be of the essence.

Accordingly, a coordinated approach which recognizes the logic of contingency planning and preparatory measures against agreed targets and estimated vulnerabilities may prove productive and purposeful. The problem could be kept within manageable limits by a phased approach which adheres to the following principles:

a. Broad policy must evolve and interim guidance must be enunciated.

b. Specific responsibilities must be assigned within existing agency and departmental capabilities.

c. General responsibilities for capability build-up must be undertaken, based on the end effect which is to be achieved. (A basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia.)

d. Intelligence requirements must be focused on specific missions consonant with capabilities, instead of generalized. (Tactical intelligence which analyses those segments of Soviet power reflecting vulnerability to date.)

e. A continuing analysis and plans development must be undertaken by an interdepartmental task force under NSC auspices after the initial framework is established and approved. This procedure is envisaged somewhat as follows:

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25X1C

(1) Phase I — Interim guidance [redacted] which will permit timely planning and establish the basic governmental position from which initial courses of action can be implemented.

(Initial statements ready by 15 October.)

(Approval and dissemination by 15 November.)

(2) Phase II — Establishment of policy, objectives, targets, assignment of tasks, and preparatory implementing steps within existing overt and covert capabilities.

(Initial outline plan ready by 15 November.)

(Approval and dissemination by 15 December.)

(3) Phase III — A regulated and progressive build-up of capabilities which provide for a systematic manipulation of individuals, groups, or captive states to ensure accomplishment of durable, long-term objectives.

(Detailed operational plan, including intelligence and logistical annexes ready by 31 December.)

(Approval and dissemination by 1 February 1953.)

2. Specific Analysis of Phase I:

a. Policy

(1) The U. S. Government's position will be to ignore the diplomatic amenities and exit condolences; other Western Powers, British and French, will be approached to adopt a similar policy.

(2) Assume a psychological offensive which evidences U. S. interest and concern in the type of government which will evolve in the USSR.

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b. Preliminary Actions (Plant the first seeds of idealistic illusion.)

(1) Development of appropriate themes along the following lines: Dictators die and cannot succeed themselves; stress the philosophy and hope that with the passing of Stalin the defacto regime in Russia will return to the democratic ideals promulgated in the first steps of the Russian revolution which were subsequently betrayed by Stalin, the State exists for the people and should be representative of their wishes and aspirations, the individual is the most important element of any society, collectivization under Stalin has deprived the individual of inalienable rights, a constructive, peaceful co-existence with the western world is possible after the ruthless tyrant leaves the scene, black rumors re Stalin's health (senility, alcoholism, blindness); malign the motives of the Presidium by quotations from Lenin; establish that after 35 years the State has not withered away and the Russian people have not achieved the tranquility and prosperity promised by Communism.

c. Subsequent Actions (Create restlessness within a power element.)

Target actions against the Soviet military forces, particularly occupation forces and military attaches. Create the impression that key military figures are in close contact and cooperating with the free world leaders in order to establish the army as patriotic guardian of Russian traditions and protectorate of the people against the excesses of the Communist regime.

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3. Special equipment

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

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25X1A [redacted]

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